DARKPC.NET
[ DARKPC // ETHICAL HACKING LAB 001 ]

Kali Linux vs Docker on Slackware

Build a hands-on web-security lab using QEMU, OWASP Juice Shop, Nmap and Metasploit. Every photograph below comes from a real DarkPC session on 15 November 2026.

SLACKWARE 15.0DOCKERKALI LINUXQEMUMETASPLOITBEGINNER-FRIENDLY
Authorised testing only. Use these commands only against your own isolated training environment or systems you have explicit permission to assess. The target is intentionally vulnerable. Metasploit was used here for an auxiliary HTTP scan; no exploit payload was executed.
LAB STEP 01

Prepare the Slackware host

Docker is already installed in this lab. Start its daemon as root, then verify the engine responds.

/etc/rc.d/rc.docker start
docker ps
Docker daemon started
Docker daemon started. Docker started successfully on Slackware. Original photo from the DarkPC lab session.
LAB STEP 02

Launch the training target

Run OWASP Juice Shop locally on Slackware. Binding to 127.0.0.1 avoids exposing this intentionally vulnerable application on every network interface.

docker run -d \
  --name darkpc-lab \
  -p 127.0.0.1:3000:3000 \
  bkimminich/juice-shop

docker ps

Open http://127.0.0.1:3000 in the Slackware browser.

Juice Shop running
Juice Shop running. The intentionally vulnerable application in Firefox. Original photo from the DarkPC lab session.
LAB STEP 03

Inspect Kali under QEMU

Kali was already installed and launched using QEMU with KVM acceleration, 2 virtual CPUs, 4 GB RAM and user-mode networking. These are observations from our session, not mandatory settings.

ps aux | grep '[q]emu-system'
# Inside Kali:
msfconsole --version
QEMU configuration
QEMU configuration. Kali running under QEMU with user-mode networking. Original photo from the DarkPC lab session.
Kali and Metasploit
Kali and Metasploit. Metasploit version checked inside Kali. Original photo from the DarkPC lab session.
LAB STEP 04

Check connectivity from Kali

With this particular QEMU user-network setup, Kali reached the Slackware host at 10.0.2.2. Confirm the address in your own setup rather than assuming it always applies.

ip -br addr
curl -I --max-time 5 http://10.0.2.2:3000

The response included HTTP/1.1 200 OK. A loopback-bound service was accessible from the QEMU guest in this setup; this is not proof of isolation from every other network path. Verify firewall rules before running other vulnerable targets.

Kali reaches Docker
Kali reaches Docker. HTTP response from QEMU host gateway. Original photo from the DarkPC lab session.
LAB STEP 05

Discover the web service with Nmap

Only scan lab targets you own or are authorised to test. Service fingerprinting may not identify every application.

nmap -sT -sV -Pn -p 3000 10.0.2.2

Observed: 3000/tcp open; Nmap did not confidently identify the service version.

Nmap scan
Nmap scan. Port 3000 identified as open. Original photo from the DarkPC lab session.
LAB STEP 06

Run a Metasploit HTTP scanner

This was reconnaissance, not exploitation. The HTTP version auxiliary module completed successfully.

msfconsole -q
use auxiliary/scanner/http/http_version
set RHOSTS 10.0.2.2
set RPORT 3000
run
exit
Metasploit HTTP scan
Metasploit HTTP scan. HTTP scanner completed against the lab target. Original photo from the DarkPC lab session.
LAB STEP 07

Inspect the exposed directory

Juice Shop deliberately includes a file-listing training route. First check the response, then list the links.

curl -s -o /dev/null -w "%{http_code}\n" http://10.0.2.2:3000/ftp/
curl -s http://10.0.2.2:3000/ftp/ | grep -oE 'href="[^"]+"' | head -30

The listing exposed filenames including legal.md, package.json, and package.json.bak. A visible filename alone does not prove its contents can be downloaded.

Directory listing
Directory listing. File links discovered in the training application. Original photo from the DarkPC lab session.
LAB STEP 08

Compare blocked and allowed requests

The attempt to fetch package.json produced a 403 page and verbose application stack trace. The permitted legal.md returned document content.

curl -i http://10.0.2.2:3000/ftp/package.json
curl -i http://10.0.2.2:3000/ftp/legal.md
curl -s -o /dev/null -w "HTTP: %{http_code}\nType: %{content_type}\n" http://10.0.2.2:3000/ftp/legal.md

Final observed result: HTTP: 200 and Type: text/markdown; charset=UTF-8. This confirms unauthenticated access to a training document, not theft of confidential data.

Blocked file request
Blocked file request. A restricted extension triggered a verbose error page. Original photo from the DarkPC lab session.
Allowed document
Allowed document. The permitted Markdown document returned content. Original photo from the DarkPC lab session.
HTTP confirmation
HTTP confirmation. HTTP 200 and Markdown content type confirmed. Original photo from the DarkPC lab session.
LAB STEP 09

Defensive lessons and cleanup

In production, keep sensitive files outside public web roots, enforce allowlists and access control on the server, disable verbose stack traces, and avoid exposing backup files. Juice Shop is intentionally insecure; do not treat it as a hardened production service.

# On Slackware, stop and remove this lab container:
docker stop darkpc-lab
docker rm darkpc-lab

Do not run the cleanup commands until you are finished experimenting. The commands remove this container, not the Docker image.

[ DARKPC // LAB 001 COMPLETE ]

Congratulations! You’ve completed Lab 001.

You’ve launched a training target with Docker on Slackware, explored it from Kali under QEMU, checked a service with Nmap and Metasploit, and learned why exposed files and verbose errors matter.

Keep experimenting safely, only on systems you own or are authorised to test. Ready for your next challenge?