Prepare the Slackware host
Docker is already installed in this lab. Start its daemon as root, then verify the engine responds.
/etc/rc.d/rc.docker start docker ps

Launch the training target
Run OWASP Juice Shop locally on Slackware. Binding to 127.0.0.1 avoids exposing this intentionally vulnerable application on every network interface.
docker run -d \ --name darkpc-lab \ -p 127.0.0.1:3000:3000 \ bkimminich/juice-shop docker ps
Open http://127.0.0.1:3000 in the Slackware browser.

Inspect Kali under QEMU
Kali was already installed and launched using QEMU with KVM acceleration, 2 virtual CPUs, 4 GB RAM and user-mode networking. These are observations from our session, not mandatory settings.
ps aux | grep '[q]emu-system' # Inside Kali: msfconsole --version


Check connectivity from Kali
With this particular QEMU user-network setup, Kali reached the Slackware host at 10.0.2.2. Confirm the address in your own setup rather than assuming it always applies.
ip -br addr curl -I --max-time 5 http://10.0.2.2:3000
The response included HTTP/1.1 200 OK. A loopback-bound service was accessible from the QEMU guest in this setup; this is not proof of isolation from every other network path. Verify firewall rules before running other vulnerable targets.

Discover the web service with Nmap
Only scan lab targets you own or are authorised to test. Service fingerprinting may not identify every application.
nmap -sT -sV -Pn -p 3000 10.0.2.2
Observed: 3000/tcp open; Nmap did not confidently identify the service version.

Run a Metasploit HTTP scanner
This was reconnaissance, not exploitation. The HTTP version auxiliary module completed successfully.
msfconsole -q use auxiliary/scanner/http/http_version set RHOSTS 10.0.2.2 set RPORT 3000 run exit

Inspect the exposed directory
Juice Shop deliberately includes a file-listing training route. First check the response, then list the links.
curl -s -o /dev/null -w "%{http_code}\n" http://10.0.2.2:3000/ftp/
curl -s http://10.0.2.2:3000/ftp/ | grep -oE 'href="[^"]+"' | head -30The listing exposed filenames including legal.md, package.json, and package.json.bak. A visible filename alone does not prove its contents can be downloaded.

Compare blocked and allowed requests
The attempt to fetch package.json produced a 403 page and verbose application stack trace. The permitted legal.md returned document content.
curl -i http://10.0.2.2:3000/ftp/package.json
curl -i http://10.0.2.2:3000/ftp/legal.md
curl -s -o /dev/null -w "HTTP: %{http_code}\nType: %{content_type}\n" http://10.0.2.2:3000/ftp/legal.mdFinal observed result: HTTP: 200 and Type: text/markdown; charset=UTF-8. This confirms unauthenticated access to a training document, not theft of confidential data.



Defensive lessons and cleanup
In production, keep sensitive files outside public web roots, enforce allowlists and access control on the server, disable verbose stack traces, and avoid exposing backup files. Juice Shop is intentionally insecure; do not treat it as a hardened production service.
# On Slackware, stop and remove this lab container: docker stop darkpc-lab docker rm darkpc-lab
Do not run the cleanup commands until you are finished experimenting. The commands remove this container, not the Docker image.
Congratulations! You’ve completed Lab 001.
You’ve launched a training target with Docker on Slackware, explored it from Kali under QEMU, checked a service with Nmap and Metasploit, and learned why exposed files and verbose errors matter.
Keep experimenting safely, only on systems you own or are authorised to test. Ready for your next challenge?